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Advanced aircraft will require flight-critical computer systems for stability augmentation as
well ;_s guidance and control thai must perfom_ reliably in adverse, as well as nominal, operating
environments. Digital system upset is a functional error mode that can occur in electromagnetically
harsh environments, involves no component dmrmge, can occur smmltaneously in all channels of a
redundant control computer, and is software dependent. This paper presents a strategy for
dynamic upset detection to be used m the evaluation of critic',fl digital controllers during the design
and/or validation phases of development. The motivation for this work is the development of tools
and techniques that can be used in the laboratory to validate and/or certify critic',fl controllers
operating in adverse environments thai result from disturbances caused by an electromagnetic
source such as lighmmg, high-inte._sity radiated fields (HIRF), and nuclear electromagnetic pulses
(NEMP). The upset detection strategy presented in the paper provides dyn;maic monitoring of a
given control computer for degraded functiontd integrity thai can result from redundancy
management errors and control command c',dculation errors that could occur in an
electromaguetic',dly harsh operating environment. In addition, an;dytical redundancy of the control
laws provides a reference of the correct control command for the given dynamic mode of the plant.
This reference command is used to detennine the effectiveness of the control in the given dynamic
situation. The paper discusses the use of Kalman filtering, data fusion, and decision theory in
monitoring a given digital controller for control calculation errors, redundancy management errors,
and control effectiveness.
Introduclipn
Advanced aircraft will require systems for stability augmentation as well as guidance and
control that will be critical to the flight of the aircraft. The trend in avionics technology is the
implementation of control laws on digital computers that are interfaced to the sensors and control
surface actuators of the aircr',fft. Since these control systems will be flight-critical, the problem of
verifying the integrity of the control computer in adverse, as well as nominal, operating
environments becomes a key issue in the development and certification of a critical control system.
An operating environment of particular concern results from the presence of
electromagnetic fields caused by sources such as lighming, high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF),
and nuclear electromagnetic pulses (NEMP). Electromagnetic fields may cause analog electrical
transients to be induced on the aircraft's wiring, and these signals can propagate to the onboard
electronic equipment despite shielding and protective devices such as f'flters and surge suppressors.
There are two types of effects to digital computer systems thai can he caused by transient electrical
signals. The first is component damage that requires repair or replacement of the equipment. The
second type of damage to a digital system is characterized by functional error modes, collectively
known as "upset", which involve no component damage. Functional error modes of a critical
controller which can be termed as upsel in the system we characterized by: (i) faulty I/O
processing and command c',flculations flint result in off-nominal system behavior or degraded
system performance; and (it) faulty redundancy management decisions that result in degraded
system perfonrmnce and/or reliability. In the case of upset, nonnal operation can be restored to the
system by corrective action such as resetting/reloading the software or by an internal recovery
mechanism, such as an automatic rollback to a system state prior to the disturbance. The subject of
effective_d reliable intemaFupSet: recov6ry mechanisms is another current topic for research.
Theusualt_atures of fauh toler_ull system,_ such as redundant input :rod output checking and
selection, surge suppression devices and filters, and a redundant naicroprocessor architecture with
w_ling may not be sufficienl to ensure correcl operation in an electromagnetically adverse operating
environment. Surge suppression devices and filters are effective for large amplitude, high
frequency transients. However, low :m3plitude sig_ds at frequencies near the clock speeds of
digital circuitry can be generated by electromagnet it" fields and propagate to electronic equipment
onb,ard an aircraft. In addition, redundancy protects against single-mode failures that occur in one
channel of the system, but does not protect against the potential comrnon-mode failure (i.e. upset)
of all channels in the redundant system as a result of transient signals induced by a single
electromagnetic disturbance.
To date, there are no comprehensive guidelines or criteria for detecting upset in fault
tolerant digitzd control computers, designing reliable internal upset recovery mechanisms, or
performing tests or analyses on digit',d controllers to verify control integrity or evaluate upset
susceptibility/reliability in electromagneticMly adverse operating environments. In order to assess a
digital control computer for upset susceptibility, the issue of upset detection must be addressed.
Real-time considerations for upset detection would reduce post data processing requirements
during validation/certification testing. Therefore, the objective of this research is to develop a
detection meth_×lology for real-time laboratory implementation whereby a given digital computer-
based control system can be evaluated for upset susceptibility when subjected to analog transient
electrJc_d signals like those that would be i_lduced by an electromabmetic source such as lightning,
HIRF, or NEMP. In the event of the occu_xence of upset during testing, the detection
methodology will also provide a frmnework for diagnosis of the upset in the given digital
controller. An illustration of the basic laboratory set-up is shown in Figure 1. The fault tolerant
controller to be evaluated for upset susceptibility is interfaced in the laboratory to a simulation of
the plant, actuators, and redundant sensors so that closed-loop dynamics are represented during
testing. The controller with o redundant processors (or microprocessors, designated as gP1 -
_P,) is subjected to disturbances like those that could occur in an electromagnetic environment. In
the case of lightning, transient signals that would be induced on internal wiring are generated. In
the case of HIRF, electromagnetic fields that could occur from radars or high-power radio
transmitters are generated. The control system is dynamically monitored for upset in real-time
during testing. The objective of the paper is to present an upset detection strategy for monitoring a
given fault tolerant controller for degraded control integrity resulting from redundancy management
errors, control command calculation errors, and control effectiveness errors that could occur in an
electromagnetically harsh operating enviromnent. Ka.lman filtering, statistical decision theory, and
data fusion are used in the detect ion of redundancy management errors and control command
calculation errors. An',dytical redundancy of the control laws provides a reference of the correct
control command for a given dynamic mode of the plant. This reference command is used in the
control effectiveness decision .......
..... + ....... Probie:m _ormu|atlon _ .... _.......
Consider the block diagram shown in Figure 2 of a given control system consisting of the
plant, redundant sensors, actuators, and fault tolerant control computer. Input/output conversions
and signal conditioning between the plant and controller are represented by the indicated blocks.
Input processing functions including analog-to-digit'a] (A/D) conversion, frequency-to-digital
conversion, surge suppressors for protection against high-level transient signals, and f'dters to
reduce high-frequency noise have been represented by the A/D and Signal Con_tioning block.
Output processing functions such as signal conditioning and digital-to-analog (D/A) conversion are
represented by the D/A and Signal Conditioning block. The given fault tolerant controller is
modeled to consist of three basic blocks. The input selection and redundancy management block
peffomls rate and/or range checks of the data values and generates the input data vector for each of
the microprocessors. The redundant microprocessors calculate the control commands based on the
input vector tk_r each processor. Redundancy in the control computer protects against single-mode
failureof components during nomml operation. The outpu! selection and redundancy management
block i×-rfonns rate and/or r_mge checks on tile calculated commands from each processor ,and
detennines via voting, or some other scheme, the command to be output from the controller for
each control loop. The following linear model is proposed for the given control system of Figure
2. The elements of the model are defined by the given system and would he determined prior to
assessment. For simplicity of notation, it will be assumed that each processor has it's own sensor
sel. Thus, it is assumed that there will be the s_une number of sensors for each measurement as
there are processors.
Plant: :_p(t) = Axp(t) + Bu(t) + _wp(t) - Xp(t) _ R e (1)
Sensors: S_(l) = Cixp(t) + _iwi(t) i = I, 2 ..... _ " ,'_(t) e R rn (2)
where: s_,(l) = [sb,(t) si,_(l) .-- sb,,,(l) I ' . si, f(t) 6 R
Input Select ion 0aad Redun&mcy Management:
Yin,(.)=i k E_(k)Sp,(k) + _fwinf(k)i i i = I, 2, ... , cy ; Yin,(k),i Sp,(k) e wr (3)
where: Sp_(k) = [s_,,(k) sp,(k) ... s_,(k)] ' ," f = 1, 2, ..., m
Redundant Controllers:
i i _wi(k) ; i= 1,2, _ xi(k)_ R nxic(k+l) = Fi,.xi.(k) + GcYin(k) + ... ;
where: xi_(k) = [xi_(k) xicz(k) "" xi,(k)l" ; xi,(k) • R
(4)
_ut Processing and Redund'anc_y Management:
Your(k) = [youi,(k) youu(k) .-. Yout.(k)]" ; youT(k) • R n
Yout,(k) = L i(k)x,.j(k) + lqjWoutj(k)
where: x,:,(k) = [_,(k) x_(k)
j= 1,2 ..... n • Youtj(k)• R
• .. _(k)]' ; _,(k)• R c'
(5)
Actualors: u(t) = Nyout(t) + pWu(t) ; u(t) • R" (6)
where: y,,u_(t) = [yout,(t) youu(t) .-. Yout,(t)] ' ; Your(t) _ R n
Equations (1) - (6) represent a hybrid model of continuous-time and discrete-time components.
Equation (I) is the continuous-time state equation for the plant. Matrix A is the plant state
transition matrix, u(t) is the control input, and Wp(t) reflects noise and/or modeling errors.
Equation (2) is the continuous-time sensor model for the ith redundant sensor with wi(t)
representing the sensor noise. Equation (3) is the discrete-time model for the selection and
management of redundant sensor inputs Sr,_(k) for the fib measurement with the noise term w_f(k)
representing modeling error. Matrix E}(k) is shown to be time-varying to represent selection,
rejection, voting, or fusion of redundant sensor measurements during operation of the system. If
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thegivensynlemhasaninpuldata.,;electionprocesswilhoul datafusion,theelementsof F__(k)will
bc7¢ro or one :uld may bc based oil heuristics, such as Ille resuh of range and/or rate checks on the
Sellsor nle.'lSUlenlelllS. In systems lhat fuse sensor measurements into a single vzdue, matrix F_k)
would represent the input data fusion process. Equation (4) is the discrete-time state equation for
the command vector calculation for the ith processor, and matri× F_. is the transition matrix. Matrix
i .
G_ is the measurement matrix for measurement vector yin(k) of the ith processor. Term wi(k)
reflects noise and/or modeling errors associated with the command vector calculation from the ith
processor. Equation (5) is the discrete-time model for the selection and management of the
redundmat cormnand calculations with modeling error accounted for in the noise term Wo%(k).
Matrix Li(kl is time-varying to represent selection or fusion of command c-,dculations for the
command vector y,,%(k) of the jth control loop during operation of the system. If the given system
has a voting strategy for output command calculations, the elements of Lj(k) will be zero or one
and may be based on heuristics associated with the voting strateg3'. In systems that combine
c;dculations into one output, Lj!k) would represent the command calculation fusion process.
Equation (6) is the continuous-nine actuator model. The actuators receive the command vector
Yout(t) and affect the dynamics of the plant via u(t). The term Wu(t) reflects noise and/or modeling
errors.
The research problem is to develop a monitoring scheme for real-time laboratory
irnplementation to be used in the validation/certification of a given fault tolerant controller, modeled
as shown in Figure 2, during operation in an electromagnetic environment that could result from
lightning or HIRF. An upset test methodology for control computers was discussed in [1].
However, this methodology relies on post-processing of data collected during every test. Since the
detection strategy presented in this paper is for eventual re'd-time implementation, it will eliminate
the need to store data during tests in which upset does not occur. In addition, the strategy provides
_m indication of where errors occurred for diagnostic purposes so that any desired post-processing
of the data is simplified.
Fault Tolerant Control Monitoring Strategy_
In order to detect redundancy management errors, control command calculation errors, and
control effectiveness errors in the fault tolerant controller, measurements of the control system of
Figure 2 must be taken by the monitor. These measurements are indicated in Figure 3, and their
equations are given as:
Measurement of the Plant State: zp(k) = Txp(k) + vp(k) ; zp(k) _ R p (7)
Measurement of Sensor Outputs: zi(k) = Dis_(k) + vi(k) ; i = 1, 2, ... O" ; Zis(k) _ Rrn (8)
= J Yin(k) + " (9)Measurement of Input Vectors: zln(k) i i Viin(k) , Z_n(k) e Rm
Measurement of Calculated Commands: zi-(k) = H_-xi(k) + vi.(k) ; z_(k) e R n (10)
Measurement of Output Command Vector: Zou,(k) = Myout(t) + Vout(k) ; Zout(k) _ R n (11)
Measurement of the Actuator: zu(k) = Pu(k) + vu(k) ; zu(k) e Rn (12)
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In equations(7) - (12), T, Di, ji, I-I_.,M, andParethemeasurementmatrices. Thetermsvp(k),
v_(k), ,i .'_,,,(k),vi.(k),Voul(k),andvu(k) representmeasurementnoise. All noiseprocessesin
equations(I) - (12)areassumedto beindependent,white,andGaussian.
Thefault tolerantcontrolcomputerismonitoredfor errorsin redundancymanagementand
controlcommandcalculations,aswell ascontroleffectivenessfor thegivendynamicmodeof the
plant. In thecontextof thismathematicalfon_ulation,upsetisdefinedasachangein anyof the
matricesEit(k)of equation(3), F_.aJ_dG_.of equation(4), andLj(k) of equation(5) thatcausesa
reductionineffectivenessand/orreliability of thecontrolsystem.A concept for upset detection in
critical digital control computers is presented in Figure 4. Redundancy management processes in
the control computer to be monitored are the input parameter selection process, the output
command selection process, and the management of redundant resources. An example of an error
in the management of redundant resources is the computer deciding that one of the redundant
sensors is bad and ignoring its measurements when, in fact, it is operating correctly. Since
eliminating a good sensor reduces the redundancy and overall reliability of the system, this
redundancy management error would constitute an upset. The redundancy management monitor
.... i keffecuvely detects incorrect changes m the matrices F-4() and Lj(k) of equatmns (3) and (5),
respectively. Elements of these matrices are compared to the input/output selection codes of the
controller to detenrfine if the controller has eliminated resources that are not faulty. Inputs to the
input selection error detection portion of this monitor are measurements of the sensor outputs,
zi(k), and measurements of the selected input vector for each channel, zin(k). If an error is not
i
detected in the input selection process, the decision va.riable din(k) will maintain its nominal value
of - 1. If an error is detected in the input selection process, the value of diin(k) becomes unity.
Inputs to the output selection error detection part of this monitor are measurements of the selected
output commands, Zo,_j(k). If an error is not detected in the output selection process, the decision
variable clouts(k) will maintain its nominal value of -1. If an error is detected in the output selection
i doutj(k) combinedprocess, the value of doutj(k) becomes unity. Individual decisions din(k) and are
or fused into one redundancy management error decision, dr(k). The calculation of commands for
each control loopj is also monitored for errors. This monitoring is done dynamically as the
commands are calculated. Changes in the matrices Fi and Gic of equation (4) are detected by
monitoring for changes in the dynamics of the control command calculation state equation. Inputs
to the control calculation error detector are measurements of the selected input vector for each
channel, zin(k), and the control command calculation vector of each channel, _(k). Individual
decisions, 4_(k), are made for the command calculations made by each processor for each control
loop and these decisions are combined or fused into one error decision, dc(k), for the calculation of
control commands. Analytical redundancy of the control laws provides a reference of the correct
control command for the given dynamic mode of the plant. Inputs to the analytical model of the
control laws are measurements of the plant state, zp(k). This reference is used in a decision
process to determine if the calculated command output vector, Your(k), is effective in regulating the
plant under a given dynamic situation. Considerations such as range and rate limitations of the
actuators will be inherent in the evaluation of control effectiveness. If a control effectiveness error
is not detected, the decision variable dej(k) will maintain its nominal value of-1. If an error in
control effectiveness is detected, the value of de,(k) becomes unity. Individual control effectiveness
error decisions, dcj(k), are made for each control loop and these decisions are combined or fused
into one error decision, de(k), for the effectiveness of the control command output vector. The
decisions corresponding to redundancy management errors, control command calculation errors, as
well as control command effectiveness errors are fused into one global upset decision, d(k), which
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hasa nominalvalucof-I anda v:ducof unity for lheupsetdecision.Thisglobalfusionprocess
mayIx:a logicalOR rule,or mayprovideweightingscorrespondingto therelativecostsof the
threeerrorprocesses.In leninduringwhichupsetoccursandissignaledbytheunit),valueof
i " doutj(k)d(k), theredundancym_magementerrordecisionsdin(k)and , thecontrolcalculationerror
decisionsd_,(k),mid thecontroleffectivenesserrordecisionsd_j(k)areall storedin themonitorasa
diagnosticaidfi_rpost-testingdatamr,dysis. A basicstrategyfor monitoringthecontrolcomputer
for erroneouscommandcalculations,redundancymanagementerrors,andcontrolcommand
effectivenessis now presented.
Control Command Cah'ulation Error Monitor. The basic approach for monitoring errors in a
control command c',dculation is shown in Figure 5. The control law is represented as a linear or
l inearized recursive state equation with state _,(k) for the command calculation of control loop j
from microprocessor i. A K',dman Filter is used to generate the estimate vector composed of an
^i
estinaate x_,(k) of the correct state for each of the j control command calculations based on
measurements of the selected input vector z!n(k) and the previous calculated command state vector
-',i
z2.(k- 1 ). The estimate x_j(k) is conapared to the current measurement z_j(k) of the jth command
calculated by the ith microprocessor, and a residual ri,(k) is generated, based on the difference. A
statistical decision rule is then applied to the residual and a decision d_j(k) is made regarding the
correcmess of the command j calculation of processor i given the selected input vector. The
decisions for command calculations j = 1, 2, ..., n are then fused into a single decision, d_(k), for
the correctness of the command c',dculations from processor i. Similar methods were used in the
detection of sensor failures in turbofan engines [2] and in the detection of failures in aircraft
actuators and control surfaces [3]. In 12], analytical redundancy, Kalman filtering, and decision
theory were used to detect sensor failures in an F100 turbofan engine. Instantaneous, or "hard",
errors were detected by comparing measured sensor values with those of an analytical model,
taking the absolute value, and comparing this residual to a threshold. Small bias errors and drift in
sensor measurements, or "soft" errors, were detected using multiple-hypothesis testing methods in
which each hypothesis corresponded to a particular sensor failure. Once a "hard" or "soft" sensor
f',filure was detected, the elements of an interface switch matrix were changed so that a Kalman
Filter estimate of the sensor value replaced the measurement in the input vector used in the control
laws. The methodology of [2] was demonstrated on a hybrid real-time simulation of the F100
engine as well as on a full-scale F100 engine with good results. However, this methodology was
not designed to detect failures in physically redundant systems and, therefore, does not use data
fusion methods. In [3], analytical redundancy and decision theory was used to detect actuator
failures and control surface failures in aircraft. The design methodology consisted of two failure
detection and identification (FDI) algorithms or subsystems - one for actuator failures and one for
control surface failures. In the actuator FDI subsystem, an analytical model was implemented to
generate a prediction of the dynamic behavior of the actuators. This prediction was compared to
measurements taken from the actuators, and a residual was generated and used in a decision
process that consisied 0t_trigger, verify, and isolate tests. The cdntrol surface FDI subsystem was
designed in a similar fashion. The methodology of [31 was demonstrated using a six degree-of-
freedom nonlinear simulation of a modified Boeing 737 airplane with good results. This
methodology was not designed to detect failures in physicall_y redundant systems and did not use
data fusion techniques.
The basic approach shown in Figure 5 is extended for the dynamic monitoring of control
calculations in redundant systems and is illustrated in Figure 6. The global decision de(k) on
whether or not control command calculation errors have occurred is based on the fusion of the
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comm:mdcalculationerrordecisionsdi,.(k)for thec_processors.Thecommandcalculationerror
decisiond_.(k)for eachprocessorisgeneratedI,y t!!eprocessdescribedasthebasicapproach
showl_in Figure5. Previouswork141comparedtwodistributeddetectionstrategies,eachusinga
differenl typeof datafusion. Onestrategyinw_lvedthefusionof estimates,andtheotherstrategy
involvedthefusionof Ioc'aldecisions.TheROCcurveof thestrategywith decisionfusionwas
shownto bemoredesirabletot two cases.
R(,dun_hmcy MatuJgement Error Monitor. Since the detection strategy of Figure 4 is for
detecting errors in the controller ;rod is to bc inaplemcnted in the laboratory setting, depicted in
Figure 2, which involves the simulation of redund;mt sensors, it will be assumed that sensor
failures do not occur. The strategy tor detecting inpu! redundancy management errors is illustrated
in Figure 7. Redundant parruneter measurements from _ sensors are used by the monitor in the
szmle input selection algorithm as that of each channel in the controller and a "prediction" of the
selected parameter inputs are made. Note thai this algorithm corresponds to Eli(k) of equation (3).
As shown in Figure 7, measurements of redundant sensor 1 inputs z_(k), Zs_(k), ... , z_,(k) are
used in the monitor's input 1 selection rule which is identical to that of microprocessor 1 to obtain
,"_ (k)the reference selected value of input 1 Yin, " • 'Dais reference v_ue is compared with a
measurement of the input I wdue actually selected by microprocessor 1, Zln,(k), and a residual is
generated. This residual, rln,(k), is used in a statistical decision rule to determine if a correct or
faulty selection of input 1 was made by microprocessor 1. This decision is designated as din_(k).
The input selection error decision process is perfonned for each redtmdant input parameter and for
each microprocessor in the controller. The input 1 selection decisions for the cy microprocessors
", o kare denoted as d_n,(k), d_'n,(k) .... , din,(). These input selection error decisions for the
processors are fused to obtain the selected inpul error decision din_(k). This error detection
structure is implemented for the m input measurements to yiel the selected input error decisions
dim(k), din2(k), , din,,(k). These decisions are then fused to obtain the global error decision for
the correcmess of the input selection process of the controller, din(k).
The output selection error detection strategy is shown in Figure 8. The Kalman filter
estimates of the command calculations for each control loop from each processor are used by the
monitor in the same output selection algorithm as that of the controller and a "prediction" of the
selected parameter outputs are made. This algorithm corresponds to Lj(k) in equation (5). As
shown in Figure 8, estimates of the calculated control command for loop j from the a processors,
Xci(k) x_(k) ..... _c_(k) are used in the monitor's coirmaand j output selection rule which is
identical to that of the controller to obtain the reference selected value of the jth control command
output, Xcj(k). These reference values are each compared with the measurement, Zoutj(k), of the
controller's selected command j output and a residual, routj(k), is fonned. The residual is used in a
statistic',d decision rule to determine if a correct Or faulty selection of output command j was made
by the controller. The decision for the jth command loop is designated doutj(k). These decisions
are then fused into a global decision, dour(k), for tile correctness of the output decision process of
the controller.
The error decisions din(k) and dour(k) for the input and output selection processes,
respectively, are then fused into a global redundancy management error decision dr(k) as shown in
Figure 4.
_t_a_rlt£_ Effectiveness Error Monit_. The strategy for monitoring the controller's command
effectiveness is shown in Figure 9. The n control laws are implemented analytically and used to
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generatea reference,)omj(k). for eachcommandloop. Thesereferencecommandsareusedin
an'Ayticalmodelsof theactuatorsto generatearefelencefor theplantcommandvariables,u_f(k),
providedby theactuators.Thecommands,y,,m,(k)outputbythecontrollerfor eachloopareused
in asimulationof theactuatorsto generatewhatwouldbetheactualplantcommandvariables,
uj(k). A comparisonismadebetweentherneasurementz_,,(k)of thesevariablesandthereference
ur_r(k)J in thefommtionof theresidualsrc,(k). Statisticaldecisions,_+(k),basedon theresiduals
aremaderegmdingtheeffectivenessof eachcontrolconmaandoutputbythecontroller.These
decisionsarethenfusedintoaglobaldecision,de(k),on thecommandeffectivenessof the
controller.
Theerrordecisionsfor theredundancymanagementprocessdr(k),thecontrollaw
calculationsde(k),andcomrnandeffectivenessde(k)arefusedinto thegloba.1upsetdecisiond(k),
asshownin Figure4. In testsduringwhichupsetoccursandis signaledby theunity valueof
d(k),theredundancy management error decisions dim(k) and do%(k)the control calculation error
decisions d_.(k) and the control effectiveness error decisions dej(k) are "allstored in the monitor as
a diagnostic aid for post-testing data analysis.
Summary and Future Work
The problem of verifying the integrity of flight-critical control computers in adverse, as
well as nominal, operating enviromnents becomes a key issue in the development and certification
of control systems for advanced aircraft. A strategy for monitoring the control integrity of a critical
digital controller has been presented. This strategy includes error decisions that can be stored
during testing and used to aid in the diagnosis of functional error modes known as upset in the
critical controller. The strategy uses Kalman f'dtering, analytical redundancy, data fusion, and
statistical decision theory in the monitoring of control law calculations, the input/output selection
process of redundant paranleters, and the command effectiveness of the controller. With the
formulation of the problem presented in this paper, subsequent steps can be taken in its solution
such as the design of the algorithms for the individual monitoring processes in the strategy. In
particular, statistic-,d decision rules and data fusion algorithnls must be designed. The design of
K',dman f'dter gains that yield globally optimal results can be considered. In addition, an analysis
of the design for detection sensitivity to changes in matrix parameter values must be conducted.
Design tradeoffs to be considered include sensitivity and diagnostic capability versus complexity,
reliable detection without false alarms, and sensitivity to erroneous parameter changes with
robustness to modeling errors. These considerations are to be treated in subsequent papers.
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